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Although recent events in Turkey raise concerns, there are grounds 
for believing a firm promise of EU membership can help advance 
reforms, writes John O'Brennan. 
 
After a fraught and difficult year, the European Union is faced with 
the extremely contentious issue of whether to proceed to substantive 
membership negotiations with Turkey. In advance of the European 
Council decision, expected on October 3rd, it is worth examining what 
is at stake for the EU. 
 
The internal EU debate about Turkey revolves around two distinct 
issues. The first is identity and culture. There are many within the 
EU who see Turkey as an Asiatic rather than a European country, or at 
best a "Eurasian" country, a bridge between Europe and Asia. Turkey's 
population of 72 million is overwhelmingly Muslim and thus seen as a 
threat to Europe's increasingly secular value system. Although the EU 
is manifestly not a religio-cultural entity, this does not prevent 
those opposed to Turkish membership, including Pope Benedict XVI, 
alluding to the weight of cultural difference as the key barrier to 
Turkish accession.  
 
The second key issue is the political power Turkey would potentially 
wield within the EU. Under the complex weighted voting system used by 
the EU Council of Ministers, Turkey would command a similar voting 
strength to Germany, France and the UK. That is something that 
worries Paris and Berlin especially. Turkish membership, say the 
critics, would paralyse a decision-making system that is already 
creaking in the wake of the eastern enlargement and the inefficient 
institutional architecture recalibrated through the Nice Treaty. 
 
In the run-up to the European Council summit, the Turkish negotiating 
hand has been significantly weakened. On the one hand the EU 
enthusiasm for further enlargement has receded significantly in the 
aftermath of both the 2004 eastern enlargement and the antipathy to 
expansion demonstrated in the constitutional treaty referendums in 
France and the Netherlands. 
 
Recent events within Turkey have not helped its cause either. The 
decision to prosecute the country's greatest123 living writer, Ohran 
Pamuk, for allegedly "denigrating the nation" by making public 
reference to the 1915 mass murder by Ottoman forces of Armenians was 
followed last week by another judicial decision to ban a proposed 
academic conference dealing with the same issue. Although the Turkish 
government had nothing to do with these decisions, they have enabled 
EU obstructionists to argue that Turkey's value system is 
fundamentally incompatible with the liberal norms which lie at the 
core of the EU's identity. 
 
What then can the EU hope to achieve in proceeding to negotiations? 
The answers can be found in the mechanisms used by the Union to 
incorporate future member-states. In short, the offer of membership 
to outside states and the management of enlargement processes has 
proved the most effective foreign policy tool the EU has employed in 
its efforts to stabilise, modernise and democratise a whole range of 
states on its southern and eastern borders over the past two decades. 
Just as earlier accession processes helped transform Greece, Portugal 
and Spain from authoritarian, economically backward states into 
vibrant and dynamic liberal democracies, so too can the accession 
process help Turkey's modernisers effect the transition they (and the 
EU) so desire. 
 
More recently, the EU's experience of eastern enlargement 
demonstrates how effective are both the membership criteria and the 
pre-accession process as instruments for reshaping the applicant 
state's public administration, judiciary, and economy. In effect, the 
EU transposes its norms on to applicant states in advance of their 
accession. The process is completely asymmetrical, with the applicant 
state having no option but to accept the changes recommended by 
Brussels. 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe the transposition and implementation of 
EU laws helped consolidate fragile democratic institutions, open up 
previously moribund economies, strengthen administrative capacity, 
reduce corruption in public life and stabilise relations between 
neighbouring countries. The benefits this has brought the EU include 
a vast increase in intra-European trade and the stabilisation of its 
external borders. 
 
At a more micro level, my own research into the eastern enlargement 
demonstrates that for EU policy to work a "good cop/bad cop" strategy 
works best. This revolves around a firm promise of membership coupled 
with the credible threat of exclusion (in the case of failure 
adequately to transpose EU legislation and norms). 
 
Prospective member-states must have sufficient incentive to carry on 
domestic reform programmes, which bring them closer to EU norms, but 
they encounter significant local opposition as more and more 
legislative measures are adopted. The actions of the Turkish 
judiciary in recent weeks constitute just such an example of domestic 
contest123ation of EU standards and have been condemned by the Turkish 
prime minister, Recip Tayyip Erdogan. 
 
Those within the EU opposed to Turkish membership should look at the 
record of reform of the AKP government since it won a landslide 
victory in the 2002 election. It has pushed through four major reform 
packages, some of which required significant changes in the Turkish 
legal code. 
 
Significant though these reforms have been, there is still a 
fragility about Turkey's engagement with modernisation and 
Europeanisation. The EU needs to act on the commission's 
recommendation to open talks. If it does it will accelerate the 
Turkish reform programme and ensure its eventual success. There is a 
lot at stake at next week's summit. The EU should not shirk the 
challenge. 
 
